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We are well aware that political life has always dealt with passions. But today it seems, in
fact, that the liberal, rationalistic approach to politics has been almost completely replaced
by its emotional dimension. Therefore, it seems necessary to explore the changing ways in
which  thought  and feeling,  rationality  and passion,  reason and sentiments,  have  been
understood both in practice and in theoretical discussions, focusing on their public standing.
This issue contains the refined version of the papers presented at the conference on this
topic, held in a period of two days at the University of Bergen in November 2019. The
conference was organised as a joint effort by the Department of Philosophy of the University
of Bergen (UiB), Norway, and the Department of Antiquity, Philosophy and History (DAFIST)
of the University of Genoa, Italy.
The  purpose  of  this  conference  was  to  approach  the  topic  of  the  relations  between
rationality and emotions, wondering which part do they actually play in politics. In many
ways, politics is the art of persuasion and often people are indeed persuaded to position 
themselves on a given subject by emotional appeals rather than reasonable arguments.
Within the political sphere, both past and present, one can actually find a complex mixture
of rational arguments and emotional discourses.
In  the  dominant  Western  philosophical  tradition,  the  relationship  between  reason  and
emotions has been marked by a conflict between various contrasting models of rationality
and emotions. The sphere of rationality and that of passions have been often categorized
according to a fundamental dichotomy: either the triumph of reason against the weakness of
sentiments or, in the popular interpretation of Hume, the triumph of passions over reason.
This dichotomy has also served as a starting base for conceptualizing politics, where already
early-modern  political  theorists  defined  political  autonomy  as  reason  dominating  the
emotions and passions.
In The Passions and the Interests (1977), Albert Hirschman described how, in the process of
modernization, the “passions”, motivating social and political behavior were transformed
into modern “interests” and they were thereby assigned the role of containing the social and
political destructive passions.
Until recent times, theorists have described both political movements and political affiliation
as based on beliefs, ethics, and sentiments. In the last years, though, an “Affective Turn”
has taken place both in analytic and continental philosophy, and in contemporary political
studies. Emotions and affects are now becoming the object of extensive, multidisciplinary
studies that challenge political liberalism’s idea that the emotions must be relegated to the
private  sphere.  This  “turn”  highlights  that  the  political  cannot  be  understood  without
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reference to human feelings.
However, the fundamental dichotomy between emotions and reason has not at all been
overcome in the forms of current politics. While it is true that, today, emotions and passions
are returning to the centre of  the political  scene,  they often do so in a passive form.
Contemporary  politics  consists  more  and  more  in  an  abuse  and  manipulation  of  the
passions. Social media, for instance, has redefined the public sphere in ways that allow
charismatic, intimidating and even hateful rhetoric to stand unchecked by editorial control.
The space of public discussion has also increased to the point where quick “instinctive
reactions”  replace  careful  reasoning.  One  could  ask  if  the  “affective”  political  change
consists in an increasingly oppressive use of the passions as forms of domination. The active
function  of  passions  and  the  way  they  can  contribute  to  the  processes  of  political
democratisation and the conscious involvement of citizens need to be duly analysed; albeit
always keeping in mind that  passions are ambiguous, for any feeling within a given political
context,  even  the  noblest  –  compassion  and  love,  inter  alia  –,  holds  its  limits  and
presupposes dangers.
This motivates the following questions: Do emotions, of any kind, pose a dangerous threat to
rationality and political life? What, for instance, becomes of democracy when a rigorous and
rational language in political debates is replaced by one that focuses on emotions, like hope
or fear? Is it possible to build  up a democratic society with no recourse to passions, mutual
trust and a belief in the right of every individual to participate in the social and political
debates? If so, what kind of emotions are positive and what kind of emotions do hinder this
development?
A key aim of the conference was seeking to define the possible paths of reflection on this
topic and study the relationships between reason and emotions, concepts of rationality and
“structures of feelings” as a marker of the political arena.
The European research team that has long been engaged in social and ethical reflection
about cultural changes in the modern and contemporary epoch chose to address these
questions by a variety of approaches.
At  the opening of  the conference Anat  Biletzki  questions populism in  the light  of  the
relationship between reasons and passions,  and wonders if  it  is  an ideology or a tool.
Retracing different definitions given by political scholars, Biletzki notes how some such as
Kazin  and  Urbinati  define  populism  as  an  instrument  while  others,  such  as  Mudde,
Kaltwasser and Pappas, consider it as an ideology. Through an in-depth analysis of the
different forms of populism, the article highlights how, understood as a rhetorical tool, it
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can be used for the most different and contrasting ideologies of the right or left. If populism
is an ideology, that is to say, a vision of the world that has people as the highest value, it
implies a form of politics that combines reason and passion. And although on the right it can
deteriorate into fascism, it can work on the left to extend democracy, as it requires to
overcome a purely rationalist idea of ​​politics.
Some of articles have a common starting point in our time politics, that sees the advance of
populism even in democratic countries; a populism characterized and also empowered by an
emotional rhetoric, focused on what we could call negative passions such as hatred and
anger.
Many papers try to understand this phenomenon and propose politically positive emotions,
not  without  critical  remarks.  As  Anne  Granberg  does:  faced  with  Marta  Nussbaum’s
proposal  to encourage socially positive emotions including compassion,  she detects the
limits  of  this  suggestion and takes  up Hanna Arendt’s  observation that  compassion is
essentially an apolitical emotion.
After recalling several scholars, from Walter Lippmann to Edward Bernays and, closer to us,
William Davies, according to whom politics was increasingly connected and based on both
individual  and  collective  emotions,  Alberto  Giordano  highlights  how  post-truth  and
polarization threaten liberal democracy, since they persuade people to rely more on feelings
rather  than  facts,  in  such  a  way  as  to  manipulate  collective  decision-making.  Recent
suggestions  to  limit  the  influence  of  political  emotions,  such  as  epistocracy  and  e-
democracy, seem not sufficiently sound both theoretically and practically. Giordano thus
proposes an intergenerational republican compact as a possible and provisional solution to
post-truth dilemmas.
More oriented towards overcoming the rigid dualism of reason and passions, Juliette Grange
tries to define the “reasoned feeling”. After highlighting the convergence of the “affective
sciences”, and the philosophical attention to emotions delivered by populism, Grange argues
that the “reasoned feeling” is  embodied by the republican passion for certain political
ideals. Enthusiasm for an idea or an ideal, altruism and a culture based on knowledge and
science, are basic traits of this feeling. The reasoned feeling is the founder of a civilization
and a social morality proper to scientific and technical modernity. In order to be realized,
this feeling must be combined with political rationality understood as a form of rationalism
that allows “a plurality  of  axiological  and social  choices and the public  space of  their
confrontation”.
The solution to the emotional dangers inherent in political options, regimes, opinions given
A Short Introduction to the Proceedings of the Conference “The
Reason of Passions: Emotion and Rationality in the Landscape of
(Contemporary) Politics”
by classical utopias is analysed by Jean Christophe Merle and compared with the imaginary
dystopias of the 20th century. The utopias of the early modern times were proposed as a
solution to the absolute political evil, namely discord, rivalry, desire to possess, domination
and glory; and as an alternative to the classical theories of social contract. Dystopias, in so
far as they constitute the opposite of the democratic and liberal rule of law, are based on
the eradication of its members’ ability to think and act rationally. The failure of both shows
the human inability to live without confronting the evil and the extreme difficulty in which
attempts to resist the dystopian order often occur.
New signs of kindness and politeness to follow in social relations can help counteract the
increase in passions and violent reaction in our democratic societies: here is Mirella Pasini’s
proposal. After going over the old Galateo of Monsignor Della Casa and the new one by
Melchiorre Gioia, she wonders if Gioia’s prescriptive goal of spreading civil education as
part of the process of training citizens of a democratic nation could be a suggestion for our
time.  Almost  the  same proposal  is  virtually  opposed by  the  agonistic  and competitive
rhetoric of the Norwegian public intellectual and author Georg Johannesen (1931-2005),
illustrated by Hans Marius Hansteen, and proposed as a way to promote peace.
The  speeches  by  Giorgio  Baruchello  and  Pascal  Nouvel,  respectively,  open  to  the
epistemological  dimension  and  the  positive  and  negative  role  of  emotions  in  the
construction of knowledge, with its obvious ethical and political consequences.
Baruchello addresses the prejudice issue, whose area ranges from the cognitive sphere to
the social dimension, according to a plurality and multiplicity of meanings that cannot be
reduced to a single negative level. Faced with the inevitability of prejudice or the not-so-
argued  need  to  overcome it  as  a  “poorly  formed  opinion,  an  unreasonable  belief,  an
unjustified false assumption, a negative feeling”, Baruchello affirms the need to investigate
its polysemy, also in the history of philosophical thought. By following this path, we could
overcome prejudice as a source of error and bad behaviour.
Pascal Nouvel, on his side, questions the nature of political errors; because, if emotions and
affects play a key role in politics, they can also play a role in political errors. A better
knowledge of what is specific in political errors could therefore help to understand the
relationships  between  reason  and  emotions,  between  rationality  and  “structures  of
feelings”. His starting point is the modern distinction – laid down by Machiavelli – between
political errors and other fashions, with which they have long been mixed. In a brief “history
of error”, Nouvel distinguishes four types, that is: perceptual error, conceptual error, moral
error and, finally, political error, still not well defined. A key point is the distinction between
moral  error  and  political  error,  which  appears  to  be  speculative  rather  than  factual.
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Understanding the nature of the political error can be useful in order to modify the affects:
this is the basic thesis. As for the method, the narrative approach is in Nouvel’s intention a
powerful way to manage political issues and, in some cases, avoid political errors.
The importance of political affections in contemporary European society is underlined by
Paola  de Cuzzani,  who remembers at  the beginning of  her  paper the rapid spread of
growing  xenophobic  and  racist  sentiments,  anti-Semitism,  discrimination  and  violence
against migrants, blacks and Muslims. For de Cuzzani the implications of these sentiments
for the stability of our liberal democratic societies are evident. Spinoza’s theory of imitation
of affects can help us in our attempt to understand the ease with which negative feelings
come to be diffused even in the most civilized and democratic societies. It also clarifies the
dangers that these negative feelings pose for the stability of the body politic.
It remains to be asked whether Spinoza’s lesson can also be useful in a positive way, in
order to provide us with tools to fight negative affects, while not running the risk to erase
affectivity but rather promoting a positive one.
Such is the legacy that this rich selection of papers offers for future studies and meetings of
the research group.
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